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After a decade of rapid growth in average incomes many countries have attained middle-
income country (MIC) status. At the same time the total number of poor people hasn’t fallen 
as much as one might expect and as a result most of the world’s poor now live in MIC. In 
fact, there are up to a billion poor people or a ‘new bottom billion’ living not in the world’s 
poorest countries but in MIC. 
Not only has the global distribution of poverty shifted to MIC, so has the global disease 
burden.  
This paper examines the implications of this ’new bottom billion‘ – the fact that up to a 
billion of the world’s poorest people now live in MIC - for global health efforts and 
recommends a tailored middle-income strategy for global health funders. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes trends in the global distribution of 
poverty, preventable infectious diseases, and health aid response to date. Section 3 revisits 
the rationale for health aid through agencies like GAVI and the Global Fund. Section 4 
proposes a MIC strategy and components. Section 5 concludes with recommendations. 
2. THE GLOBAL DISTRIBUTION OF POVERTY AND 
DISEASE 
2a. The global distribution of world poverty 
Data presented in Sumner (2010; 2011a; 2011b) and Kanbur and Sumner (2011) 
demonstrates that there has been a change in the global distribution of poverty from low-
income countries to middle-income countries. This shift raises all sorts of questions for aid 
and the ways aid agencies identify eligible countries (see in particular, Sumner, 2011c).  
In 1990, 93% of the world’s poor lived in LIC. Now, more than 70% – up to a billion of the 
world’s poorest people or a “new bottom billion” -- live in middle-income countries, and 
most of them in stable, non-fragile middle-income countries (see Figures 1 and 2). The total 
number of low-income countries (LIC) has fallen and will fall drastically further (Moss and 
Leo, 2011) (see Figure 2); however, global poverty defined as the total number of people 
living under US$1.25 or $2 per day has remained around 1bn and 2bn respectively (1990-
2007), if China is excluded.    2 
Further, most of the world’s poor live in countries that have moved from low to middle-
income country status since 1999 when China graduated to MIC status - notably Pakistan 
(2008), India (2007), Nigeria (2008), and Indonesia (2003) (henceforth, with China, the 
PINCI). China is now an upper MIC as of July 2011. 
This concentration of the world’s poor in relatively few countries is a key part of the story: 
Although 28 countries have transitioned from LIC to MIC since 2000, about 60% of the 
world’s poor now live in just 5 populous new MIC countries – the PINCI noted above. 
Indeed, of the top 10 countries by contribution to global poverty, only 4 are LIC among the 
top 10 -- Bangladesh, DRC, Tanzania and Ethiopia. See Figure 3 below. 
Is the trend of concentration of world poverty in new MIC likely to continue? Chandy and 
Gertz (2011) estimate the proportion of the world’s poor in MIC at slightly below 70% 
(about 66%) and project that this proportion of the world’s poor in MIC will still be 55% in 
2015. This projected fall of the share of the world’s income poor in the MIC is based on an 
assumption of static inequality and thus fast falling poverty in the MIC especially so in India 
and China. However, Kanbur and Sumner (2011) have suggested this may be overly 
optimistic view of poverty reduction in the MIC given trends on inequality in fast growing 
economies. Furthermore, Moss and Leo’s (2011) projections of GNI per capita suggest that 
the number of LIC may well fall to around 20 in 2025, moving even more of world poverty 
towards the MIC over time (see Figure 2). 1 
Graph 1. Where do the income poor live? 
 
                                                        
1 A further issue arising is that of the mismatch of ”poor countries”or country classifications (measured by the 
Atlas  measure  –  an  exchange  rate  conversion)  and  “poor  people”  or  poverty  measures  (measured  by  PPP 
conversion). Any threshold is arbitrary. The question is the sensitivity of the findings to the threshold chosen. 
Both matters are discussed in-depth in Sumner (2011c).  
   3 
Graph 2. Where do the multi-dimensional poor live? 
 
Graph 3. Actual and projected numbers of LIC and MIC, 2000-2025  
 
Sources: Moss and Leo (2011); World Bank (2011)    4 
Graph 4. Concentration of the world’s poor, top 10 countries, $1.25 a day, 2007 
MIC in red, LIC in blue 
 
Sources: Kanbur and Sumner (2011)  
So are MIC just poor countries by another name? Overall, it is evident that MIC (Lower and 
Upper MIC) have higher standards of living than LIC and are far less aid dependent (see 
table 1). The average, population weighted, GNI per capita – by Atlas or PPP - in lower 
MIC is quadruple that of LIC; the average human development score is significantly better in 
LMIC compared to LIC (including and excluding non-income components) and the average 
poverty headcount (% population) in LMIC is half that of LIC. Further, the removal of 
China and India or the PINCIs group of 5 countries from LMIC does not make much 
difference to human development indicators for the LMIC. However, the removal of the 
PINCIs substantially reduces the average poverty headcount in the LMIC. Further, measures 
of inequality – the Gini and proportion of GNI to the poorest - are somewhat similar in LIC 
and LMIC (and more unequal in UMIC). The removal of China and India or the PINCIs 
does not make a large difference.  
Finally, LMIC have much lower ODA dependency data than LICs. The removal of China 
and India or the PINCI raises aid dependency indicators but to levels still far lower than that 
of the LIC group.  
In the discussion so far the emphasis has been on MIC as a similar grouping of countries. 
Within this grouping, however, there are clear differences, particularly in regards to the need 
for official development assistance (ODA). For example, there are “emerging” powers, such 
as  India  and  Indonesia  that  have  little  need  for  ODA  but  still  have  substantial  poor 
populations. Large fragile MIC, such as Nigeria and Pakistan, also have large numbers of 
poor people and may have limited need for ODA, but state capacity for poverty reduction   5 
and public health programs are a significant constraint. Stagnant, non-fragile MICs may need 
ODA to support productive capacities, including human capital investments in health and 
education, and there are also fast growing LIC, which will graduate to MIC status soon. One 
example of the contradictions is Angola - a MIC, who will soon also pass the $1,500 per 
capita threshold implying graduation from GAVI assistance but still has low immunization 
rates  and  health  outcomes,  suggesting  that  having  a  higher  average  income  does  not 
necessarily  translate  into  better  health  outcomes.  This  heterogeneity  suggests  that 
approaches to reduce health inequities in MIC countries will need to be tailored to types of 
MIC as well as differ from those adopted in LIC.  
 
Table 1. Human development indicators in LIC, LMIC and UMIC (population 
weighted) 
 


















GNI  per  capita  (Atlas,  current 
US$) 
2009  494.5  2276.3  1851.4  2112.7  7480.3 
GNI  per  capita  (PPP,  current 
int’l $) 
2009  1156.5  4703.6  3769.0  4370.0  12494.9 
Human Development Index  2010  0.39  0.58  0.55  0.58  0.71 
Non-Income HDI  2010  0.46  0.62  0.60  0.63  0.74 
Poverty  headcount  (% 
population,  US$1.25)  (non-
adjusted base years) 
2000-
2007 
52.4  27.1  25.4  15.6  5.2 
Gini  2000-
2007 
38.8  39.3  39.1  40.8  47.1 
GNI to poorest 20% (%)  2000-
2007 
7.1  6.8  6.8  6.4  4.7 
Net ODA received (% of GNI)  2008  12.3  0.6  1.5  2.2  0.2   6 


















Net ODA received (% of gross 
capital formation) 
2008  51.3  2.0  5.8  7.8  0.9 
Per  capita  public  health 
expenditures US$ (PPP) 
2009  26  120      516 
 
Source: Sumner (2011c, forthcoming) and health expenditures from WHO; Notes: * insufficient LIC data for 
2007-2009; Data refer to the most recent available data within that period and if there is no data between 
those periods, then that data point (for a particular country, for a particular indicator) is ignored; all table 
lines are population weighted as follows: (sum of (indicator x country population))/total population of 
countries with data on that indicator); correlations use the most recent data in the periods stated (Atlas GNI 
pc, 2009; HDI 2010; Non-HDI 2010; Poverty headcount 2000-2007). 
Graph 5. PINCI Income Distribution (GNI % by quintile expenditure groups) 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators  
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2b. The distribution of the global disease burden 
The distribution of the burden of disease has also shifted to the MIC. MIC as a group has 
larger disease burdens than LIC related to vaccine-preventable disease, HIV and 
tuberculosis. Disease burden is concentrated among the PINCIs but with still significant 
numbers in the non-PINCI lower MIC as well as –more surprisingly- the upper MIC in the 
case of HIV/AIDS. Particularly, in the case of vaccine-preventable diseases, middle-income 
countries, particularly PINCI, have a much higher burden than low-income countries. 
Graph 6. Total burden of disease (DALY), all causes (‘000), 2004  
 
Source: World Health Organization Global Disease Burden Database, 2008 
Note: “Lower middle income” and “upper middle income” categories do not include PINCI, which are shown 
separately. “Total MIC” includes all categories: “lower middle income”, “upper middle income” and 
“PINCIs”.   8 
Graph 7. Number of people living with HIV, 1990-2009 
 
Source: World Health Organization Statistical Information System (WHOSIS) 2011. 
Note: See explanation of categories in Graph 6. 
Graph 8. Burden of disease associated with HIV/AIDS (DALY) (‘000), 2004 
 
Source: World Health Organization Global Disease Burden Database, 2008 
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Graph 9. Number of cases of tuberculosis, 1990-2009 
 
Source: World Health Organization Statistical Information System (WHOSIS) 2011 
Graph 10. Burden of disease associated with tuberculosis (DALY) (‘000), 2004 
 
Source: World Health Organization Global Disease Burden Database, 2008 
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Graph 11. Number of cases of measles, 1990 and 2010 
 
Source: World Health Organization Statistical Information System (WHOSIS) 2011 
Graph 12. Burden of disease associated with measles (DALY) (‘000), 2004 
 
Source: World Health Organization Global Disease Burden Database, 2008   11 
Graph 13. Total burden of disease associated with vaccine-preventable diseases 
(DALY) (‘000), 2004 
 
Source: World Health Organization Global Disease Burden Database, 2008 
The shift in disease burden to MIC is driven mainly by population size but also by lagging 
effort on the public health programs that can prevent or control disease. Complete 
vaccination rates are lower in MIC than LIC: according to household survey data in 20 LIC 
and 17 lower MIC, on average, 42% of children under age five are fully vaccinated in lower 
MIC versus 55% in LIC. This same household survey data is depicted in the scatter plot in 
graph 14, looking only at DTP-3 coverage, illustrating that many MIC, particularly India and 
Nigeria, have very poor vaccination performance. That performance is also considerably 
lower than would be suggested by their level of income per capita. Administrative data –
generally considered to be of poorer quality than household survey data (see box 5 on 
China)- provides a more encouraging picture but is still consistent with the patterns 
observed in household data. Beyond this, new vaccines, such as vaccines against rotavirus, 
pneumococcal disease and Haemophilus Influenza B (Hib), are not yet introduced in many 
MIC (WHO 2008). MIC of all types fare worse than LIC on ARV coverage of HIV positive 
people.    12 
Graph 14. Number of DTP-3 unvaccinated children (2010) and number of people 
infected with HIV and not receiving ARV treatment (2008)  
 
Source: World Health Organization Statistical Information System (WHOSIS) 2011. 
Note: DTP-3 vaccination rate pertains to 1 year olds, calculated by multiplying the crude birth rate, life table 
survivors at the age of one, and the total population, divided by 100. The period is 2005-2010.  
Graph 15. DTP-3 Vaccination Coverage and GDP per capita in LIC and MIC 
 
Source: World Health Organization Statistical Information System (WHOSIS) 2011; household surveys on 
vaccination. 
Note: Line represents the income per capita threshold between LIC and MIC, which is $1,006 according to 
the most recent World Bank definition.   13 
Global health agencies have perhaps accentuated these patterns by favoring LIC in their 
funding allocations. In 2009, 46% of total health aid from Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) donors was directed to LIC (CRS 2009 database; own calculation), 
whereas 39% was directed to LMIC and 14% was directed to UMIC. Further, health aid 
correlates poorly to disease burden. Some global health agencies, such as the GAVI Alliance, 
have set eligibility thresholds that progressively graduate the lower middle-incomes that are 
currently eligible (see Box 2). While some LIC and LMIC may not reach this threshold2 
given their current economic growth projections, many former low-income countries have 
graduated from GAVI. In 2000, 72 countries were eligible for GAVI assistance; currently 
there are 56. By 2020, under GAVI’s current policy, only 42 countries, representing half of 
the currently eligible population, will qualify for GAVI support (See Table A.2).3 Further, 
caps have been placed on the amount of funding to large countries, such as India. 
The decision to target most funding to LIC is based on the idea that MIC have fiscal 
capacity to spend “enough” on health in general and can reallocate to disease control 
priorities. Yet prospects for large increases or reallocation in public spending on health are 
modest. Saxenian et al (2011) analyzed GAVI-eligible countries’ fiscal space, finding low 
levels of government spending on health overall. Although the lower middle-income 
graduating countries have higher per capita spending on health compared to LIC, health 
spending constitutes a smaller share of their government spending and prospects for 
expanding that share are limited. Currently, none of the lower MIC countries receiving 
support from the GAVI Alliance for new vaccines are currently paying full costs from 
domestic resources; under an optimistic scenario, Saxenian et al find that “assuming the full 
costs [of existing and new vaccines and their delivery] would put many at the outer limit” of 
the maximum recorded share of vaccine spending in more wealthy Latin American countries 
(used as a reference point given absence of other normative estimates for spending 
requirements as a share of total budget). As lower MIC have an average per capita health 
expenditure of $36 - $107 in 2008, it will be challenging to significantly increase the share of 
vaccine spending in their health budgets. Given the limited fiscal space, many of the GAVI 
eligible lower MIC – and recently graduated - countries will need to rigorously assess the 
cost-effectiveness and affordability of new vaccines, undertake substantial reallocation within 
health budgets or seek external grant financing to scale up vaccination and incorporate 
relevant new vaccines.  
 
 
                                                        
2 The threshold is defined according to the World Bank’s income classifications, which is adjusted every year and 
accounts for ‘international inflation’.  
3 GAVI’s eligible population drops from 328.6m in 2010 to 155.9m in 2020 (UN Population Forecasts, own 
analysis). We base our per capita income analysis on the IMF World Economic Outlook report until 2015, and 
extrapolate until 2020, the end of the decade of vaccines, by using the average predicted economic growth rate 
over 2010-2015.    14 
Box 1: Global Fund eligibility criteria 
A recently published decision of the Global Fund Board puts more restrictive 
eligibility criteria in place for funding in MIC, similar though somewhat less restrictive 
than the GAVI policy:  
“Low-income countries (LIC) shall be eligible without specific restriction. Lower 
middle income countries (LMIC) shall be split into two income groups using as a cut-off 
the midpoint of the range of GNI per capita for LMIC as reported by the World Bank. 
Countries at the midpoint or below the midpoint shall, for the purposes of this Policy, be 
described as ―Lower LMIC and those above the midpoint as ―Upper LMIC. Upper 
middle-income countries (UMIC) will be evaluated for eligibility based upon their 
respective disease burden… All Lower and Upper LMICs may submit proposals for HIV 
and AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and/or Cross-cutting HSS but must focus at least 50 
percent of the proposal‘s budget on Special Groups and/or Interventions for 
applications to the General Funding Pool and 100 percent on Special Groups and/or 
Interventions for applications to the Targeted Funding Pool.” 
The change in eligibility policy was “designed to ensure that available resources are 
allocated to countries and regions with the highest disease burden and least ability to 
bring financial resources to address these health problems, while giving due priority to 
communities and subpopulations at high risk of disease.” 
The Global Fund’s historical, less restrictive eligibility criteria led to a high 
correlation of size of grants with relevant disease burden (0.84). Within disease priority 
areas, however, there have been major discrepancies between need and allocation. A 
study by Snow et al (2008) found that specific high population density countries receive 
disproportionately less support per capita to scale up malaria control, in spite of 
comparable disease burden.  
It is unclear how the new eligibility policy will help or hurt the Fund’s potential 
disease-specific targets such as an AIDS transition or the elimination of malaria nor its 
efforts to assure greater sustainability in disease response.    15 
Box 2: GAVI eligibility criteria 
 
Eligibility for GAVI support is determined by national income, All countries with a 
GNI per capita below US$1,500 qualify for support, according to the most recent World 
Bank GNI Atlas method data. The threshold will be adjusted annually for inflation. 
Made official in January 2011, the threshold currently covers 85% of the population 
of DTP3-unvaccinated children. However, as populous lower MIC continue to grow 
economically, they will lose GAVI eligibility despite large cohorts with low levels of 
vaccination: Nigeria, India and Uzbekistan are all approaching the threshold, and are 
expected to graduate in the next few years (see annex for a complete list of projected 
graduates, as well as the population projection of GAVI countries). 
Once the threshold is crossed, the country enters into a “graduation process” where 
existing commitments are honored but no new proposals can be submitted or funded. 
Countries graduating in 2011 are exceptionally allowed to apply for new and underused 
vaccine support in the June 2011 proposal round.  
In 2010, GAVI grants are negatively correlated with the number of unvaccinated 
children (-0.24) and not at all correlated with cases of vaccine-preventable disease, 
suggesting that actual burden is not taken into account and/or that GAVI has been 
successful in supporting LIC in the reduction of VPD burden. Historically, funding for 
India was capped at US$250 million. Since 2000, GAVI has disbursed a total of $1.8b to 
low-income countries, and $1b to lower- and upper-middle income countries. 
 
To examine the issue of fiscal capacity to increase public spending from another perspective, 
Ravallion (2010) has estimated the marginal tax rates on the “rich” (those earning more than 
$13 per day) required in order to bring the entire population up to a minimum standard of 
consumption, eliminating extreme poverty (US$1.25 per capita). In many ‘old’ MIC, the 
amount of redistribution required to end poverty is often very small. Ravallion (2010) has 
argued that most countries with an average per capita income over $4,000 PPP per capita 
would require very small additional taxation to end poverty.4  
However, in many new MICs, the marginal tax rates would have to be much higher. This is 
due to large populations of poor relative to the number of “rich” people in many new MIC. 
In India, for example, the poverty gap would require a marginal tax rate on the “rich” of 
over 100%. In short, the capacity to redistribute or to spend significantly more on health 
may be limited even at higher per capita incomes, meaning that, at least for the near future, 
                                                        
4 As an example, Brazil’s Bolsa Familia which distributes US$50/month to 11 million families cost about 0.5% of 
GDP in 2005 (Fiori, 2008)   16 
public spending on health in at least the lower middle-income countries may require some 
kind of shared endeavor between donors and new MIC. 5 
Although reallocation towards more cost-effective preventive health interventions is often 
advocated for MIC, this effort has evidently been difficult if coverage rates or introduction 
of cost-effective new technologies are the metric. While the cost of the technologies 
themselves has clearly been a major obstacle to scaling up (RDI, 2011), there are equally 
important political economy considerations. Public funding is usually allocated on a 
historical basis by inputs and as a response to population demand for curative care in urban 
areas. Public spending is highly concentrated on salaries and pensions, and there is little 
“flexible” funding to reallocate to specific disease control uses. Few countries have 
budgetary priority-setting mechanisms that allow for the systematic analysis and 
incorporation of new technologies. Several large LMIC such as China and India have 
national purchasing requirements that essentially rule out the possibility of importing a new 
technology, donor-financed or not. Finally, prevention is an inherently unattractive 
expenditure target from a politician’s short-term point of view; there are few tangible 
benefits and there is little population demand for preventive care. 
In addition, the worst lower MIC performers are also fragile states; The Economist has recently 
termed Nigeria, Pakistan and Sudan “middle-income but failed or fragile states” (or MIFFs). 
Most challenges in these settings relate to weak governance and corruption. Transparency 
International’s 2010 index classifies Pakistan and Sudan among the highest fifth of countries 
in corruption perceptions. However, a study of Global Fund grant data found that its grants 
performed well in fragile states, but were mainly channeled to non-governmental entities 
making a strong case to pursue this modality (Bornemisza et al 2010). Recent events in 
Nigeria are less encouraging; the Global Fund recently froze its disbursements to one of its 
non-governmental principal recipient on the basis of audit findings. In Pakistan, a major 
issue is the loss of territorial control and the recent total decentralization of its ministry of 
health. 
Finally, there is also a political optics issue; it is easier to defend aid spending when it is 
obviously targeted to extremely poor countries. The recent discussion and parliamentary 
hearing on DFID’s decision to continue to provide aid to India is an example of the 
difficulties facing donors when considering MIC funding. India’s establishment of its own 
aid agency with a budget of US$1.5-2bn/year is likely to raise further questions – what if 
most of the world’s poor live in countries that are new foreign aid donors themselves?6 
                                                        
5 An important question for donors will be the new middle classes in MICs and their preferences for 
redistribution. OECD (2011) discusses in some considerable detail this issue of middle class preferences for the 
amount and type of income redistribution and redistributive fiscal policy. 
6 See report at Economist (2011).   17 
3. AID, HEALTH AID AND MIC: WHY ARE WE PROVIDING 
HEALTH AID IN THE FIRST PLACE? 
Kanbur and Sumner (2011) outline three general reasons to continue aid to MIC on a case-
by-case basis: First, donors with poverty reduction and equity objectives have no choice but 
to work in MIC if most of the world’s poor are in these countries. Second, spillover effects 
of MIC growth, such as climate change, that may negatively affect LICs and their poor 
provide an argument for directing development assistance toward public goods and aid flows 
to countries that are part of the solution to the underlying negative externalities. Third, by 
engaging with MIC, aid agencies gain knowledge that can then be useful for development 
assistance to LIC, such as implementing social safety nets.  
Many of the arguments that support continued aid engagement with MIC in general also 
apply to health aid in particular, with some nuance.  
First, donors with health equity improvement objectives have no choice but to work in MIC 
if most of the world’s at-risk populations are in these countries. As with aid targeted to 
poverty  reduction,  health  aid  funding  should  conceptually  respond  to  need,  defined  as 
burden of disease or at-risk populations, adjusted for the fiscal capacity of the recipient. 
However, there is a nuance to this equity objective – global health funders also seek to 
assure that cost-effective health technologies reach the poor. Yet as we have seen, the LIC 
category is no longer a good proxy for the poor, nor is average income a good measure on 
which to base decisions about affordability or differential pricing structures since there is an 
extremely high concentration of wealth in MIC (Yadav, 2010). 
Second, supporting public goods in MIC and limiting negative spillovers to LIC should be 
central for global health donors. Particularly for agencies like GAVI and the Global Fund, 
the control and elimination of preventable infectious diseases is a global public good, given 
its benefits that are universal in terms of countries and people. Klepac et al (2011) find that 
local and global incentives to vaccinate may be diminished in a more interconnected world, 
as  costs  for  vaccination  strategies  are  determined  by  the  relative  costs  of  infection  and 
control as opposed to transmission rates. Control and elimination in MIC will also limit 
negative spillovers in LIC, as when for example the DR Congo, a LIC that was polio-free 
since 1990, had to cope with an imported outbreak of polio in late 2010 from Angola, a 
MIC. Reducing negative spillovers and their costs would benefit donor countries as well. 
Third, there is a clear opportunity for cooperation in the scale up of basic health programs. 
Since  LIC  have  arguably  done  better  than  MIC  on  public  health  coverage  under  more 
difficult circumstances, there is much know-how to exchange in all directions. On the other 
hand,  MIC  have  interesting  experience  in  targeting  safety  net  programs  that  could  be 
relevant to improving equity in health. Further, the wealthiest countries in the world now 
experience  significant  challenges  in  reaching  the  entire  population  with  vaccination  and 
public health prevention messages; for example, much could be learned in the U.S. from 
public health programs abroad.   18 
One-size-fits-all solutions are not feasible; however, a dedicated and tailored MIC eligibility 
and allocation strategy is needed if both equity and disease objectives are to be met.  
One  reason  behind  donor  reluctance  to  support  MIC  is  that  funding  directed  to  MIC 
necessarily implies less funding for LICs. Yet the costs associated with this modest shift in 
resources could be offset, given the efficiency of investing in MIC: the case for vaccination is 
relatively clear.  
Expanding the market for newer vaccines could both increase competition and decrease 
prices rapidly for new and existing vaccines, and the disparity between immunization rates of 
LICs and MICs could be reduced. Because most of the costs to produce a vaccine are fixed, 
the more vaccines are produced, the lower the unit cost of a vaccine. As bulk purchasing and 
market  shaping  help  drive prices  down,  expanding  GAVI  eligibility,  or  letting  MIC  use 
GAVI  or  a  new  tier  of  MIC  prices  with  higher  co-financing  could  help  lower-income 
countries as well.7 
Working in MIC could also allow for efficiency gains; MIC have most capacity to introduce a 
new vaccine and assume its financing over time, benefiting a large number of children  at a 
lower cost – while LIC have lower capacity health systems, will need longer-term external 
funding, and may benefit fewer children (Glassman and Sumner 2011). 
Further, "herd immunity" (the threshold for vaccination rates above which disease cases 
become highly infrequent) against most vaccine-preventable diseases benefits all countries by 
reducing the frequency of imported outbreaks.  
In addition to cost offsets, funds invested in the middle-incomes will have most impact on 
health.  Vaccines  are  among  the  most  cost-effective  public  health  interventions;  and  the 
economic  rationale  for  investing  in  vaccines  is  that  its  immediate  benefits  of  lives  and 
treatment  costs  saved  outweigh  the  costs.8  A method to calculate the effectiveness of 
vaccines in a specific country setting is to use a value-of-statistical-life approach, which looks 
at the trade-offs people make between risks of death and income; generated from how much 
a typical individual is willing to pay to reduce the risk of death. With this method,  Ozawa et 
al (2011) calculated that vaccines have the highest impact (value -of-statistical-life) in India, 
Angola, Nigeria, Indonesia, Pakistan and Sudan, all of which are lower middle -income 
countries; India, for example, had 181,300 vaccine-preventable child deaths, and Nigeria had 
91,100.  
Finally, as countries  and global health funders   are successful at extending coverage of 
interventions such that their target diseases are no longer problems of public health 
                                                        
7 For a breakdown of vaccine costs, see 
https://extranet.who.int/aim_elearning/en/finance/market/market/factors/2.html 
8 See for discussion on the economic benefits of vaccination and related debates: Bloom et al., (2005) and 
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significance, the relative cost-effectiveness of the intervention from a national perspective 
decreases,  while  the  cost-effectiveness  of  the  intervention  from  a  global  perspective 
increases. Klepac et al., (2011) model this mismatch to better understand the incentives 
facing  local  versus  global  policy-makers  in  the  context  of  vaccine-preventable  disease 
control. Where there is considerable movement of population between and among countries 
and regions, the authors’ model finds that this inter-connectedness promotes free-riding in 
vaccination and results in lower levels of vaccination in each subpopulation relative to the 
global  optimum.  The  authors  conclude  that  coordination  of  vaccination  efforts  will  be 
required to achieve global elimination, and that long-term optimal strategies will focus on 
reaching herd immunity. Since all countries will benefit from disease control and elimination, 
now and in the future, the arguments behind the economics of elimination and global public 
goods apply; to realize the human and financial benefits from any of the investment in 
control  and  elimination,  costs  associated  with  elimination  should  be  globalized  and  the 
global health funds have a role to play.  
4. COMPONENTS OF A MIC STRATEGY 
It is important to distinguish between the different kinds of support for LIC and MIC. For 
LIC, direct resource transfers are necessary given the very low per capita health spending. 
For MIC, however, international support and partnerships can take many different forms, 
many of which are not directly about resource flows. That said, there is still a role for a 
modest amount of global funding and facilitation that could leverage greater financing and 
better results in the MIC (and further new MIC might themselves contribute to GAVI and 
the Global Fund, noting India’s proposed foreign aid budget of $1.5-$2bn/year).  
The components of a MIC strategy fall into four sub-groups: global public goods; pricing 
and procurement; knowledge transfer; and accountability mechanisms.  
1.  Global public goods:  
 
a.  Reaffirm that the control and elimination of infectious disease is a global public 
good.  
As a global public good, costs for the prevention and control of infectious 
disease of public health significance should be shared according to the net 
benefits that would be generated by their control and elimination, or lacking this 
information, cost sharing according to ability to pay is reasonable. Wealthier 
MIC have begun to contribute to GAVI and the Global Fund, but are far from 
contributing their “fair share” if measured as equivalent to their GDP. Further, 
aid-giving governments still spend substantially less on these and other public 
goods in favor of country-specific spending programs (Birdsall and Leo 2011). 
Similarly, most developed countries are contributing lower than their fair share 
to organizations like WHO.  
Given current economic realities, Birdsall and Leo recommend a new collective 
financing mechanism that is specifically designed to address global public    20 
Box 3. Defining disease elimination versus disease control 
 
Elimination refers to the “reduction to zero of the incidence of a specified 
disease…continued intervention measures are required.”  
Control has been defined as “reduction of disease incidence, prevalence, morbidity 
or mortality to a locally acceptable level as a result of deliberate efforts…continued 
intervention measures are required to maintain the reduction.” (Molyneux, Hopkins and 
Zagaria 2004) 
 
goods. While GAVI and the Global Fund are in themselves collective financing 
mechanisms and GAVI has led on the International Finance Facility for 
Immunization, both organizations continue to lack revenue streams that are 
long-term, sufficient and predictable to accomplish the tasks they are assigned. 
Therefore any effort to build out Global Public Good funding via innovative 
financing should include both GAVI and the Global Fund. 
 
b.  Eliminate the country income threshold or classification as an across-the-board 
eligibility criterion for global health funding, recognizing that both equity and 
disease control objectives are best met by an objective-based approach to 
allocating aid. 
From an elimination perspective, an allocation mechanism or strategy should 
aim to reach and impact those countries that concentrate cases of disease or at-
risk population.  
From a control perspective, where the goal is to minimize the overall incidence 
of infection in a situation of constrained resources, the best strategy may be to 
deploy resources preferentially to populations with the highest proportions of 
susceptible individuals (Rowthorn, Laxminarayan and Gilligan 2009), adjusting 
for a country’s fiscal capacity to spend in the health sector, while creating all 
kinds of incentives for reduced input prices and greater domestic investment in 
and delivery of cost-effective interventions.  
For both perspectives, allocation decisions should build off the objectives set 
for each disease control priority and use “epidemonomics” models such as 
PneuMOD9, that combine the methods of epidemiology, demography and 
economics to determine optimal allocation of scarce resources between and 
within countries. The Global Fund has developed a prioritization model which 
looks at the Technical Review Panel (TRP) results, income and disease burden: 
similarly, allocation decisions could be made according to an index which 
combines disease burden and income level, which would benefit LMIC with 
worse health outcomes. 
                                                        
9 For more information about PneuMOD, visit 
http://www.cddep.org/projects/pneumococcal_modeling_project_pneumod   21 
We believe that this is the most important solution to the current problem: 
donor activity should not only be based on income thresholds, but incorporate 
the real objective of health aid, which is to improve health outcomes.  
 
c.  Develop a “big 5” strategy that reflect the specific barriers to change in the large 
populous MICs – the PINCIs; recognizing that many states or provinces within 
the PINCIs would be classified as low-income countries if they were 
independent (for example, certain Indian states and Chinese regions). 
The “big 5” merit their own dedicated strategies given their importance to the 
global disease control effort. Many studies have been done that can be 
synthesized for this purpose, but bringing it together with an eye on the 
objectives of the support is needed. For disease control and elimination 
objectives, epidemonomics models can help determine the optimal allocation of 
scarce resources within a country. For equity objectives, building on safety net 
programs, geographic poverty targeting instruments and poverty-targeted 
demand-side financing to identify the poor and reduce barriers to access offer 
promise to overcome access obstacles. The Global Fund already requires 
poverty-targeted investments in its eligibility criteria, yet it has not established 
relevant tools or measures that would allow this poverty focus within MICs to 
be tracked and evaluated. Identifying the poor may also help to introduce a 
sliding scale of co-pays for ARV, for example. 
 
Adjusting operational modalities and activities to deal with the unique 
governance and political economy challenges in the “big 5” is a next step once 
allocation in support of control and elimination are made clear. Box 4 illustrates 
the variety and complexity of issues facing India.  
 
d.  Create incentives for blended multilateral development bank (MDB) lending 
with grant financing to leverage on-budget spending on public health priorities 
and results.  
 
Since straight-out aid is only appropriate for a sub-set of the poorer MIC, 
blended financing arrangements that use very modest grant resources to 
leverage or inform multilateral lending for infectious disease control may make 
sense. As debt taken on by borrower governments, MDB lending is demand-
driven and necessarily reflects borrower priorities. However, MDB routinely 
support government decision-making on priorities via policy dialogue and 
analytical work. Further, instruments such as performance-based debt buy-
downs can generate both visibility and commitment from borrower 
governments. MDB operations’ disbursements are also on-budget, contributing 
to establish a permanent line item to fund vaccination or other infectious 
disease control programs. 
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Box 4: The Case of India  
   
India is an example of a lower middle-income country about to cross the GAVI 
threshold: a dynamic and growing economy with considerable inequality and social 
exclusion, most of the population still lives under the US$2 poverty line. About 5% of 
India’s GDP goes to healthcare, only 0.9% of which is by the government (public health 
expenditures in India are $43 per capita); consequently, out-of-pocket expenditures 
form a majority of health spending. To change this, India has recently started an 
initiative called the National Rural Health Mission, which hopes to increase public 
spending on health gradually to 2-3% of Indian GDP. Another characteristic of India is 
that state governments have a larger role in health financing than the central 
government, and the NRHM plans to increase the central government’s health spending 
from less than 30% to 40% by 2012, and oblige the states to increase their own health 
spending by at least 10% every year. However, the World Bank judges this target as 
unlikely, given the current fiscal capacity of both states and the central government, as 
increasing overall public health spending to 2-3% of GDP would translate as states 
increasing spending by 22-38% per year (Berman et al, 2010).  
India currently has one of the world’s largest immunization programs, yet the 
results of the program are poor: 4.7% of all deaths in India among children under 5 
years of age are due to childhood-cluster diseases. Furthermore, vaccination programs 
constitute only 2.1% of the national government’s health budget, and fewer than 44% of 
Indian children are fully immunized. Pneumonia is a leading source of death among 
Indian children, but vaccines for Hib and pneumonia are not distributed widely in India.
1 
India has been focusing on eradicating polio and introducing the monovalent vaccine. 
However, despite a decline, polio has not been eradicated yet: 14% of NRHM spending 
is made on polio vaccination, compared to 3% spent on routine immunizations, and the 
emphasis on polio campaign may have detracted from other immunization programs 
(Laxminarayan 2009). 
India has the capacity to invest in its own public health programs, but the challenge 
is to set priorities, invest in programs that would make a difference, and leverage sub-
national performance and spending. Analysis shows that vaccines are the most cost-
effective intervention to improve health in India: devoting one percent of Indian GDP to 
vaccination could save as many as 480 million healthy years of life. The additional cost 
per capita each year to sustain a 90% immunization rate with 6 basic vaccinations that 
are already included in the national immunization program (diphtheria, tetanus, 
pertussis, tuberculosis, polio and measles) would be less than 3 rupees (80 cents) per 
child in the poorest states, and even less in others (Laxminarayan 2009). 
According to its GDP per capita forecasts, India will graduate from GAVI eligibility in 
2015, and would have support for another 5 years. With this, the population of 0-4 year 
olds in GAVI eligible countries will drop by 50%. Given these projections, India    23 
Box 4, continued 
 
exemplifies a challenge for GAVI: it is the most populous LMIC, but not the only one, 
that could use further assistance from GAVI. 
 
 
2.  Pricing and procurement:  
 
a.  Set up regional pooled procurement schemes or negotiate a GAVI/Global 
Fund MIC public sector price within existing procurement mechanisms. 
As mentioned above, Saxenian et al. (2011) have argued that new vaccines may 
be unaffordable in GAVI-eligible lower MICs, even under optimistic 
assumptions on price, growth and priority to health. National budgets in these 
countries may not be able to absorb the costs of new vaccines without 
continued GAVI support. One of GAVI’s benefits has been its market-making; 
increasing the volume of vaccines procured alongside greater certainty in 
available finance, which may have contributed to drive prices down. Including 
MIC, especially the populous PINCI, could help LIC benefit from lower prices 
as well. 
 
Further, lower both GAVI-eligible and –ineligible MIC report that price is a 
major obstacle to adoption of new vaccines, according to a Results for 
Development Institute study. Therefore, facilitating public sector access to a 
lower-than-market price for key vaccines and medicines is a major challenge.  
The Pan American Health Organization’s (PAHO) Revolving Fund10 for the 
purchase of vaccines is a good example for MIC in other regions and has 
obtained affordable prices for its participating countries. All participating 
Member States contribute 3% of the net purchase price to a common fund that 
is used entirely as working capital, which offers a line of credit to participating 
Member States that may need it due to intra-year fiscal constraints. This line of 
credit enables a Member State to pay the Revolving Fund within 60 days of 
receipt of the products. The Revolving Fund handles the planning and 
consolidation of demand, negotiations with producers, the placement of 
purchase orders, coordination with suppliers, and the monitoring of shipments, 
as well as financial aspects involving paying suppliers and billing countries.  
However, the PAHO Fund’s lowest possible price clause could potentially 
subvert efforts to assure the very lowest prices in LIC – Brazil obtains the same 
price as Haiti. Outside the Fund itself, the clause prohibits participating 
companies from providing a lower price to the GAVI Alliance for LIC. For a 
PAHO-type fund to work in other regions or via GAVI, it will be necessary to 
                                                        
10 For more information about the PAHO revolving fund, visit 
http://new.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1864&Itemid=2234&lang=en   24 
convince MIC governments –in Latin America and elsewhere- that while they 
will obtain a lower than market price, it will not be the lowest possible price in 
the name of supporting the global public good of infectious disease control and 
elimination, from which they also stand to benefit.  
 
The UNITAID-organized Medicines Patent Pool is also an interesting model 
for reduced prices in MIC. The Pool negotiates with pharmaceutical companies 
to share intellectual property and license the generic production of HIV 
medicines. The Pool recently announced it had begun negotiations with 
Boehringer-Ingelheim and Bristol-Myers Squibb for patents on HIV medicines 
essential to treating people living with HIV in the developing world. The Pool 
was already in negotiation with five other patent holders and concluded its first 
licensing agreement with a leading pharmaceutical company, Gilead Sciences in 
July 2011. However, to date, these negotiations have included only HIV-related 
medications, for which there is a large and vocal international lobby. While a 
small-scale effort for neglected tropical diseases was also launched by GSK, it is 
unclear whether the same conditions would hold for other disease priorities and 
related vaccines and medicines. 
 
Some pharmaceutical firms have committed to reduced rotavirus and HPV 
vaccine prices for GAVI eligible and graduates, however, this agreement 
remains verbal and GAVI should make efforts to formalize these commitments 
for GAVI graduates.  
 
b.  Encourage the pharmaceutical industry to deepen differentiated pricing 
strategies within MICs.  
 
Pointing out the highly segmented within-country markets for rich and poor in 
MIC, Yadav (2010) sets out a compelling theoretical and empirical argument for 
greater use of differentiated pricing by industry that could lead to both increased 
affordability for low-income populations and higher profits for pharmaceutical 
companies. Yet differentiated pricing will only be interesting to industry if MIC 
governments can show that these markets are indeed segmented. Global health 
agencies can help by supporting the use of poverty targeting instruments to 
obtain eligibility for health services by poor populations thus allowing the public 
sector to effectively reach the poor, as well as strengthening and improving 
accountability in the public sector supply chain in order to minimize product 
diversion to non-poor internal markets.  
 
c.  Help establish MIC-based Advance Market or Purchasing Commitments 
(AMC/APC), for infectious disease prevention, diagnosis and treatment. 
There are a number of infectious diseases that are geographically concentrated 
and affect MIC, such as TB, dengue, P. vivax malaria and Chagas disease. The   25 
wealthier MIC remain affected by frequent outbreaks, over-prescription of anti-
malarials and antibiotics, and surveillance requirements would benefit from new 
preventive and diagnostic technologies.  
 
MIC like China and India, among others, have developed drug manufacturing 
capacity and emerged in the last decade as important sources of inexpensive 
generic medicines for both domestic and international markets. Hafner and 
Popp (2011) find that Chinese and Indian imports have a significant effect on 
the average cost of pharmaceutical imports from high-income trading partners 
in developing countries. Other MIC producer countries are found to be less 
competitive. To enhance competitiveness, a government-sponsored AMC or 
APC could support local manufacturing capacity while addressing major disease 
burden, or strains focused in those countries.  
 
Know-how gained from the development of the AMC at GAVI could be 
shared with affected governments. Brazil would be a particularly good candidate 
to employ an AMC for Chagas or an APC for a dengue vaccine that is nearing 
the end of third stage clinical trials. 
 
3.  Build evidence-based priority-setting institutions 
 
a.  Provide support and build economies of scale to support national evidence-
based priority-setting processes and institutions.  
 
While the World Health Organization “helps developing countries with limited 
policy capacity or expertise by critically reviewing vaccines and establishing 
evidence-based policies for vaccine use, it is not in a position to rank or 
prioritize use of many vaccines in a given country.” (Levine et al 2011) Neither 
GAVI nor the Global Fund require countries to conduct economic evaluation 
and assessment of budget impact/affordability on technologies ahead of 
funding, in spite of its critical importance to the sustainability of the disease 
prevention and control programs that they support. While basic vaccines may 
be relatively uncontroversial and low cost, new vaccines and the interventions in 
HIV/AIDS –for example- demand more rigorous assessment, that could feed 
into value-based pricing and reimbursement decisions, and would help 
transition countries from the use of external reference pricing in public or social 
insurance systems to value-based pricing.11 Yadav (2010) suggests that 
                                                        
11 External reference pricing as done by countries generally “has insufficient adjustments for quality variations; 
uses price ratios rather than price levels; artificially measures countries’ wealth (for example, using a country’s 
lowest-paid unskilled government worker as a benchmark); disregards patents; is too slow in adjusting to changes 
in prices, inflation, and exchange rates; and requires difficult-to-obtain procurement prices.” See:   26 
economic evaluation –if used to take public spending decisions- “would (also) 
help untangle the complex web of interrelationships in price that exist between 
countries and that make manufacturers wary of changing price in any country 
due to the resulting cascading effects” in other country markets. An example of 
the potential for priority-setting institutions comes from Thailand’s Health 
Intervention and Technology Assessment Program (HITAP), which decided 
against adoption of the costly HPV vaccine in favor of a less expensive but 
equally effective screening and treatment approach that subsequently resulted in 
a more favorable price for HPV being offered to government.  
 
Support for priority-setting is evidently important, particularly in the PINCI. 
China was GAVI-eligible between 2002-2006, yet still has low vaccination rates 
as evidenced by household surveys. Similarly, India is soon to be phased out, 
but has lower vaccination rates than many LIC. On the macro level, PINCI 
possess the resources; which is why supporting evidence-based decision-making 
is required. 
 
4.  Accountability mechanisms:  
 
a.  Pilot and evaluate results-based ex-post aid or debt buy-downs  
Since the problems related to prevention and control in MIC are more related 
to priorities and incentives than financial constraints, aid instruments that create 
positive incentives for improved or sustained performance are a possible 
solution. COD Aid –which conditions aid disbursements on independently 
verified improvements in performance-, is one aid instrument that merits 
piloting and evaluation (Birdsall, Mahgoub and Savedoff 2010). Performance-
based debt buy-downs, such as those used to buy down World Bank IDA loans 
for polio vaccination coverage, also merit attention but have not been formally 
evaluated. However, it is important to recognize that the amount of the aid 
transfer will be less of an incentive in the relatively wealthy MIC than the 
visibility associated with the agreement and its measurement.  
COD Aid may be particularly relevant in settings where disease elimination is 
imminent, where surveillance must be maintained in order to realize the benefits 
of years of investment in control by governments and aid agencies, and where 
the mismatch between cost-effectiveness at the global and local levels is large.  
 
b.  Name and shame for increased global accountability and more accurate data.  
The global health community has done much to define the characteristics of 
“good” vaccination and infectious disease control programs. Yet country 
performance on financial and programmatic results is piecemeal, dependent on  
                                                                                                                                                       
http://www.technet21.org/index.php/documents/view-document-details/1164-vaccine-price-and-vaccine-
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Box 5: China and Survey Data 
 
Although official statistics usually present a better picture on vaccination rates, such 
statistics do not accurately represent the scale of the problem. The World Health 
Organization’s official statistics for China, for example, show 99% coverage of the BCG 
vaccine, 99% coverage of the DTP-3 vaccine, and 92% coverage of the Hepatitis B 
vaccine. However, the Chinese National Health Survey, a representative sample survey 
conducted by the Carolina Population Center at the University of North Carolina and the 
Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention in 9 provinces, finds much lower 
rates. In 9 provinces, BCG vaccination stands at 33%, DTP-3 at 48% and Hepatitis B at 
46%. These discrepancies between official data and survey data suggest that it is 
important to keep these disparities in mind when evaluating vaccination rates. 
 
Box 6. MCC: A Model for Global Health? 
 
The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) presents a model for looking ahead 
for GAVI and the Global Fund, and the need to adopt a case and region-specific 
approach as opposed to broad income categorizations and cutoffs. The MCC works with 
eligible poor countries through project-specific compacts. Eligibility is based on a 
number of criteria, including governance, human development indicators and income 
level. MCC works with governments, but can work with local as well as central 
governments: MCC worked on projects in middle-income countries such as Georgia, 
Armenia and Ukraine. 
The MCC example brings two implications for health aid in middle-income countries: 
first, instead of simply looking at income per capita, GAVI and other organizations can 
expand their scope and work with middle-incomes by funding individual projects or 
compacts. Secondly, given the nature of regional inequality in middle-income countries, 
GAVI could think of partnering individually with regions, at the sub-national level. 
 
self-reported administrative data, and has limited public visibility. More could be 
done to create reputational incentives (like the Human Development Report’s 
league tables where neighboring countries are compared or countries at same 
income per capita but different poverty outcomes) for better performance on 
key public health priorities. More attention to independent and rigorous 
measurement of program outputs and outcomes will benefit program managers 
and donors, while an annual ranking of composite performance could be used 
by local and international civil society to pressure for improvements. Rankings 
also serve to encourage completeness and accuracy in financial and 
programmatic data.  
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c.  Pilot and evaluate civil society investments that leverage public sector 
investment.  
 
Using their unique capacities as public-private partnerships, in countries with 
major governance and capacity constraints, GAVI and the Global Fund could 
rethink their roles as mainly national government counterparts to work directly 
with sub-national governments and non-governmental organizations to increase 
intervention coverage among the poor – or create new civil society 
accountability mechanisms that ask bigger questions about why, if a country has 
the financial means, its government is not delivering for the poor. 
 
GAVI has a civil society window that provides limited cash-based support to 
CSO, but does not enable these groups to directly provide vaccines. Yet much 
successful work in fragile states such as Afghanistan, Cambodia, Haiti, Liberia 
and elsewhere has been accomplished through the performance-based 
contracting of non-governmental providers.  
 
 
The Global Fund has experimented with funding to civil society organizations, 
with mixed success. A grant to China was frozen because of corruption among 
implementing organizations – although this freeze was recently lifted. Grants to 
organizations in Russia for prevention and care of HIV among intravenous drug 
users has failed to leverage government support to scale up. On the other hand, 
in Ukraine, grants that have been targeted towards civil society organizations 
were deemed to be performing well and have leveraged government response.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The distribution of global poverty and disease has changed. Global health agencies will need 
to adjust their outlook to remain effective, looking at their approaches to eligibility, 
partnerships and staffing to run more complex and highly co-financed MIC programs. 
A worry among donors has been moral hazard. Based on the fungibility of aid with other 
sources of funding of the public budget (Lu et al 2010), there is the risk that providing aid 
financing to middle-incomes will decrease their own spending on health. However, it is 
important to recognize that we are experiencing the counterfactual situation today; low and 
under-investment in cost-effective interventions to eliminate infectious diseases as problems 
of public health significance. This reality argues for implementation and evaluation of the 
four strategies, with a focus on leveraging public budgets. While remaining vigilant for moral 
hazard, graduation should be based on objectives achieved; such as increases in full 
immunization rate or decreases in vaccine preventable disease burden, not the passing of an 
arbitrary income per capita threshold.  
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In sum, global health funders are thus at a crossroads. In one direction, they could maintain 
the current model, phasing out countries and allocating funds based on average per capita 
income. This appeals to financially strapped donors, but fails to meet the global public health 
objectives that were the rationale for their creation. In another direction, global health 
donors could develop targeted engagement with MIC, using some of the strategies suggested 
here.    30 
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Annex 
Table A.1. Income groups and unvaccinated children 
Income Group  Population under 1 year  Percentage of unvaccinated children 
  1995-2000  2000-2005  2005-2010  1995-2000  2000-2005  2005-2010 
High income  12,291,397  12,191,928  12,456,729  3.00%  2.17%  2.08% 
Low income  19,912,420  21,316,118  22,822,768  22.60%  20.95%  17.28% 
Lower middle income  28,415,452  29,917,254  30,466,497  29.91%  31.06%  43.34% 
Upper middle income  16,292,047  16,339,442  16,118,425  7.08%  4.95%  4.14% 
China and India  43,911,026  42,409,224  41,859,980  37.41%  40.87%  33.15% 
Total  120,822,341  121,820,365  124,158,821       
Source UNFPA World Population Data (2011); WHOSIS (2011) 










Source: UNFPA World Population Estimates, 2011 
 
Table A.2. Countries graduating from GAVI, according to income forecasts, and 
population aged 0-4 (thousands)   35 
  2010  2015  2020  Graduates 
in 
Cote d'Ivoire  2969  3154  3361  2020 
India  127979  127332  125290  2015 
Kenya  6664  7460  7986  2020 
Lao  683  668  665  2018 
Lesotho  274  281  281  2019 
Nigeria  26569  29669  32762  2012 
Papua New Guinea  962  999  1046  2019 
Sao Tome and Principe  23  24  25  2015 
Solomon Islands  80  84  88  2014 
Sudan  6391  6868  7300  2011 
Uzbekistan  2738  2783  2751  2012 
Vietnam  7186  7022  6526  2014 
Yemen  4057  4603  4926  2018 
Zambia  2412  2966  3492  2015 
TOTAL  188987  193913  196499   
Source: UNFPA World Population Estimates, 2011; Income forecasts from IMF World Economic Outlook 
 